This paper has two central objectives. Generally, its purpose is to trace the trajectory of the fiscal relationships that exist between Canada's two orders of government. In particular, the main focus is on the linkages financing post-secondary education.
Enumerating powers between two orders of government in Canada was, among other things, conceived as a way to manage political discord between the French and English in British North America. 5 Initially, this bi-cultural compromise safeguarded distinct cleavages in the new Dominion. However, Monahan notes that the allocation of legislative responsibility "did not establish Canada as a true federal union." 6 In fact, several aspects of the Constitution Act, 1867 indicate the constitutional framers intended the central government to occupy a superior status, 7 which has given rise to lasting challenges between the two orders of government.
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The division of legislative powers between the two orders of government is detailed in Sections 91 through 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 9 Section 91 enumerates the federal powers, and consists of two parts. Part one describes a general grant of power to the federal parliament, known as the "Peace, Order and Good Government" clause, while Part two lists twenty-nine exclusive federal policy areas.
10
Section 92 assigned sole responsibility for sixteen policy matters to the provincial governments. 11 Section 93 allocates responsibility for education 12 to the provinces, Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1999: 99-128 Thompson, 1996: 69-77. 8 This paragraph has been paraphrased from Paul Weaver, Fiscal Federalism and Social Policy in Canada: The Financing of Structural Adjustment, Term Paper for POL 324, 1 March, 2002: 4, 5. 9 Three special provisions of the Constitution Act -sections 109 (where the provinces were given full title to "All Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties" within their boundaries), 121 (describing unfettered trade of "All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture" between the provinces), and 132 (the federal Treaty power) -was allocated to the federal government and hence, could also be argued to be federal. 10 For example, ss.91 (1); "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce, ss. 91(3); The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation and ss.91 and ss (4); The borrowing of Money on the Public credit. 11 For example, ss.92 (2) "Direct taxation," ss.92, (3) "The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province," and ss. 92 (7) "The establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals." subject to four provisions.
13 Section 95 describes two concurrent powers, agriculture and immigration, while sections 96 through 101 relate to the judiciary.
14 As Canada became increasingly industrialized, debates emerged regarding the utility of higher education and whether its provision should be an individual or government responsibility. For example, some have argued that post-secondary education enables individuals to access greater social and economic opportunities; 15 that is, whether higher education is a vehicle for social and economic advancement.
According those who subscribe to this view, the provision of post-secondary education is a societal responsibility and as such, ought to be administered by government. Others 16 however, assert that higher education should be an individual, not societal responsibility, arguing that it is the individual themselves that receives the most benefits from a postsecondary education. In this instance, the federal government realized that a university education underpins social and economic development, representing a long-term societal investment. 17 Acting on this recognition, after the turn of the twentieth century Ottawa embarked on several initiatives to ensure increased access to this resource.
18
12 At Confederation, this meant responsibility for religious or denominational schools. 13 Here, Whittington and Van Loon argue that section 93 established limitations on the exercise of this power by the provinces. According to them, the limitations translate into education being a concurrentshared -policy area between the two levels of government, endowing the federal government with the power to "police" and "protect" the rights of religious minorities. Whittington and Van Loon, 198 
Fiscal Federalism and The Financing of Higher Education
Many of the powers listed in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 granted the federal government extensive levers over the economy and other areas of national concern. In addition, the constitution also endowed the provinces with the legislative and regulatory responsibility for matters of local importance. At times, this division of responsibility has led to competition between federal and provincial policy domains. In many instances, taxation, the means to raise revenue for policy expenditures to finance social policy areas such as post-secondary education for example, has been especially problematic. Under the original Constitution, the provinces were limited to direct taxation powers only -listed in section 91 (2) and (3) Hum and Strain, 22. policy area. 24 As the twentieth century progressed, the nature of the federal government's involvement would become increasingly explicit. For the most part, this resulted as Ottawa began to use the power of its purse to shape the nature of provincial funds directed toward post-secondary education.
A Paradigm Shift; or two, or three…
In the decades that followed the Second World War, the fiscal relationships between institutions of higher learning and both levels of government underwent many changes.
Three phases of intergovernmental funding emerged during this time. First, from the 1950s to late 1960s, the federal government adopted a nation building strategy of panCanadian initiatives to help facilitate the post-war economic expansion. This relationship was characterized by a brief period of direct block grants to individual institutions that not only augmented their individual operating costs but also supplied the labour market with a steady supply of skilled graduates. Second, from the 1960s until the early 1990s, a series of cooperative, intergovernmental arrangements sustained a criterion of national standards for access to post-secondary institutions within the different provinces developed. And last, acute fiscal and economic exigencies created by public concern over a rising deficit and continental integration in the early 1990's necessitated a hasty federal withdrawal from many shared policy areas including post-secondary education.
Acting on the 1951 Royal Commission on National Development for the Arts,
Letters and Science, the federal government established per-capita funding transfers known as block grants to fund institutions of higher education. 25 The grants transferred funding directly to the institutions themselves, rather than to individuals as with the 24 Ibid.
Veterans Act funding. This funding shift reinforced the federal toehold in that area of provincial jurisdiction.
In the 1960's, another per-capita grant system emerged to further alter the intergovernmental arrangements funding post-secondary education. Due to the nature of the per capital funding, increased enrolments and limited revenues at this time, institutions in different provinces began to offer irregular levels of access and quality of service. Provinces like Nova Scotia for instance, with small populations and tax bases experienced difficulty providing adequate levels of access to their residents as demand for entry into post-secondary institutions increased. Alternatively, Ontario, which received larger grants because of their larger population, suffered no such difficulties. In essence, the per-capita transfers established an asymmetrical system of policy development, whereby the larger provinces with more institutions, received more funding and were thus able to provide higher quality services than the smaller, less populated provinces. In sum, a "patchwork" of policies developed.
The per-capita grants from the federal government to post-secondary institutions ended in the late 1960s. In their place, the federal government began to transfer postsecondary education funding directly to the provincial governments. And in turn, the provinces issued individual operating grants to the institutions in 1967. 26 This shift in funding translated into the provinces receiving an unconditional block transfer from the federal government consisting of cash and tax points, which represented fifty percent of the operating grants of the post-secondary institutions. According to Barker, these grants were issued with the expectation that the provinces would pay for the remaining 50%, 27 this arrangement was known as a cost-sharing or 50/50 funding arrangement. The 50/50 spending formula established a system of financing higher education where the provincial government was expected to pay 50% of the operating costs of the post-secondary institutions and the federal government 50%, without any of the other "conditions"
placed on social initiatives such as social welfare or health care; 28 however, despite the increasing scope of federal involvement in this area, it did not have the constitutional authority to regulate the institutions specifically or policy domain in general-this responsibility continued to fall to the provinces.
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Despite the increased flow of revenues that accompanied the new funding regime, the design of the agreements was flawed. For example, because the 50/50 funding formula was a federal initiative that intersected an exclusive area of provincial jurisdiction, Hancock 30 and Barker argue the arrangements became a flashpoint for intergovernmental tension. For some observers of this funding mechanism, the 50/50 formula was a pliable funding device that not only ensured each province had a secure source of funding for higher learning but also gave them enough flexibility to decide where the funding would go. Paul Barker for example, argues that the pan-Canadian agreements were established with the consent of the provinces and in doing so, increased funding levels ensured reasonable levels of access to post-secondary institutions. federal government to invade areas of provincial jurisdiction. In this instance, Baier argues the fiscal transfers to the provinces allowed "the federal government to infiltrate areas of provincial jurisdiction," 32 and triggered partisan conflicts between Ottawa and the provinces. In particular, many of these tensions developed between the two levels of government regarding the connection between the federal government's spending in areas outside of its jurisdiction and the constitutional responsibility for an emerging social union.
33
In addition to the intergovernmental tension, the new funding arrangements to the provinces also established some unintended consequences. For instance, vertical fiscal imbalances between institutions in different provinces started to emerge. These imbalances occurred in two different ways: first in terms of access to post-secondary institutions and second, quality of educational services provided. In the first instance, since the original federal funding was calculated on a per-capita basis and transferred revenue directly to the institutions, provinces with larger populations and more institutions received higher levels of federal funding and were therefore endowed with the capacity to delivery better services. And in the second case, because the transfer of funds and tax points were of a block variety, the new changes did not provide the provincial governments any inducements to sustain adequate levels of service delivery.
Consequently, when demand increased, the provinces began to struggle to deliver in the points is not really a federal contribution. Instead, because of the changes, the provinces simply took responsibility for an area of taxation vacated by the federal government.
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By linking the growth of federal transfer payments to annual growth in the provincial economy and population changes in the EPF benefited both Ottawa and the provinces. For Ottawa, the changes established a limit to its spending obligations, while also providing an escape clause 44 that allowed them to elude an increasingly costly financial relationship with the provinces. 45 Similarly, the provinces were given the much-needed flexibility to design their own programs. In the end, Ottawa's spending on post-secondary education began to substantially decline because of the funding changes, which signaled the beginning of a sea change in activity to shift the increasing burden of funding higher education onto the individual provinces.
The second major change to the funding formulas for post-secondary education came with the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in the 1995 federal budget. Over the course of the next several years, the new funding mechanism was a major blow for areas of provincial social policy, including post-secondary education. The CHST was a block grant 46 consisting of three different parts; one, an "amalgamation of purpose-specific grants" 47 that consolidated post-secondary education, 43 Redden, 9. 44 Paul A. R. Wilson and France St. Hilaire in The Evolution of Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements: Putting Humpty Together Again, argue that implementing the EPF was a strategic, rather than structural decision, designed to sever the cost-sharing links to provincial expenditures in order to induce the provinces to eventually assume full responsibility for all social programs. Kingston: Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, 1999. Queens University, Institute for Intergovernmental Relations, Working Paper Series, Available at: <http://qsilver.queensu.ca/iigr/publications/recent_publications/hobson_st_hilaire_chapter.pdf>, 163. 45 Baier, "Judicial Review and Canadian Federalism," 30. 46 Despite being a block grant, the CHST still imposed conditions on the provinces in order to receive funding. For example, the provinces agreed not to impose residency requirements on those seeking social assistance and must comply with the conditions of the Canada Health Act in order to receive funding for provincial health care services. 47 Brown, 63. social assistance and health care expenditures into one "super block fund;" 48 two, substantial cuts 49 to the amount of funds transferred to the provinces; 50 and three, a plan to eliminate fiscal disparities between provinces. 51 Under the CHST, federal contributions towards post-secondary education significantly declined over the next five years, falling "behind most other areas of social funding." 52 Among other things, much of the cutbacks were due to an ongoing war on the deficit and Canada's membership and participation in an increasingly globalized trade environment. Together, however, they have reoriented the focus of delivery of higher educational services toward policy efficiency rather than policy equity.
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So far, this essay has tried to establish the fiscal linkages between the federal and provincial governments in Canada and their relationship to the provision of postsecondary education. It has been argued that the federal government has used its superior fiscal position to impose national standards in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, namely that of post-secondary education. Despite the simplicity in which these arrangements have been presented, these intergovernmental relationships that finance and 48 Allan M. Maslove, "The Canadian Health and Social Transfer: Forcing Issues," How Ottawa Spends 1996 Spends -1997 
Where do we go from here? Concluding Comments
This essay has examined the fiscal arrangements between Canada's two orders of government. In particular, it has emphasized their relationship to the provision of postsecondary education in Canada. From the nature of the discussion to this point, it is clear that over the course of the twentieth century, the federal government has entered into and subsequently reduced its level of involvement in this area. This is apparent simply from observing the decline to their financial commitments directed towards higher education. In this instance, the provinces have been forced to make up for much of the funding shortfalls due to their constitutional responsibilities. This occurrence has had lasting public policy ramifications and raises more questions regarding the normative and ideological doctrines guiding federal and provincial policymaking. Foremost among 61 Deregulation of tuition fees refers to the process of removing all provincially imposed limits on tuition fee increases, which allows the individual institutions to set fee levels. Chris Charlton, "Ontario," Missing Pieces II: An Alternative Guide to Canadian Post-Secondary Education, Denise Doherty-Delorme and Erika Shaker eds., Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 2001: 30. 62 Brigette Bouchard and John Zhao, "University education: Recent trends in participation, accessibility and returns," Education Quarterly Review, vol., 6 (4) 2000: 25-27. concerns in this area however, is the federal government's entrance, influence, and eventual departure from an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.
Some would argue that since higher education is a positive externality of a market economy that optimizes the overall social welfare, governments have a responsibility to supplement that societal need. 63 This seemed to be the case in the years following World War Two; however, as Canada has became increasingly reliant on the market to provide services to individuals, both levels of government began to shift their policies toward post-secondary education to reflect more of an individual or voluntary approach. In this way, the federal government has relinquished its fiduciary obligation to fund higher education to the provinces, who have then passed it on to individual institutions.
Consequently, many are left with the difficult task of trying to meet increasing levels of service obligations with limited resources. For some, this may provide a partial explanation for the increased tuition fees.
In sum, changes to the funding of post-secondary education in Canada represent shifting policy priorities that have ultimately come full-circle. It has only been over the last three decades that both levels of government have began to reduce their financial commitments to institutions of higher learning, which suggests that many do not want not want the responsibility of providing post-secondary education. By funding individuals and institutions directly, the original objective of post-secondary education was oriented towards facilitating the post-war economic expansion, as the federal government supplied the economy with a steady source of skilled labour. As the economy expanded and levels of direct government funding began to decline however, market based instruments have 63 Howlett, 28. crept into the public domain, which indicates that government policy towards higher education is changing to reflect the increasing importance of economic principles in the provision of public policy. In this instance, both the federal and provincial levels of government have begun to shift the provision of public services like post-secondary education to the market and funding back onto individuals. If the recent trend of funding cuts and rising tuition fees continue, higher education may once again become an exclusive policy domain for the wealthy who will be the only ones able to afford the fees in order to attend.
